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Abstract
The fast development of market outlets (e.g., supermarkets, processing industries, international markets)
in China provides rich opportunities for small-scale farmers to upgrade quality and increase income.
However, the high level oftransaction costs incurred in small-volume-based vegetable transactions hinders
farmers from participating in these emerging markets. This article explores how personal relationships
(called guanxi in China) and trust between farmers and their buyers influence transaction costs in
vegetable transactions, and thereby also farmers' participation in emerging markets. We interviewed
167 vegetable farmers in Jiangsu Province, which provided data for empirical testing using two-stage
probit analysis with endogenous variables. The findings suggest that guanxi and trust effectively reduce
transaction costs in vegetable marketing in China, which may help and encourage farmers to better
participate in emerging markets. The results also reveal that farmers' age, education, marketing expe-
rience, distance to the market, production scale and land quality influence transaction costs. The article
ends with policy implications with respect to efficiently reducing transaction costs in vegetable supply
chains in order to create a better environment for small-scale farmers in emerging markets in China.
Additional keywords: buyer-seller relationships, smallholders, supermarkets, transaction costs
Introduction
The sheer size of China's economy, its rapid growth and its increasing integration into
the global economy make China a crucial player in the world market for agricultural
products (Van Tongeren & Huang, 2004). Today, China is one of the largest vegetable
producers in the world. In 2004, it supplied more than 550 million tons ofvegetables,
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accounting for one-third of the world's production (Anon., 2004). Although the contri-
bution of agriculture to farmers' total income decreased drastically from 60% in 1984
to 33% in 2002, vegetables are still an important source of income - especially cash
income - for farmers in China. In 2000, about 16% of farmers' per capita net income
came from vegetable production. Vegetable production and related activities (e.g.,
processing and marketing) employed about 160 million rural labourers (Liu et a!', 2004).
Vegetable markets in China have changed dramatically during the last two decades.
Various new forms of vegetable outlets are now also emerging. Supermarkets in China
are a rapidly growing segment (Reardon et a!', 2003; Hu et a!', 2004) that aims to
source and deliver high-quality and safe vegetables to modern consumers in urban as
well as rural areas. In China, the present market share of supermarkets is estimated
at approximately 30% in urban areas and the growth rate is still some 30% per year
(Anon., 2006). Vegetable processing for international markets is also developing
quickly (Lu, 2007), even though the requirements for quality, quantity, safety, consistency,
and delivery frequency are higher in these markets. Increasingly, they require tracking
and tracing of food safety throughout the supply chains. As a result of these trends,
building co-ordinated or integrated vegetable supply chains has become a priority task
for the Chinese vegetable sector in order to increase farmers' income and improve food
safety (Anon., 2006).
China's vegetable sector, however, faces several challenges. The fast growth of the
production scale has led to an over-supply oflow-quality vegetables. Quality and safety
have become major constraints for further development of the Chinese vegetable sector
(Lu, 2007). Vegetable producers, who mainly are small-scale farmers, face difficulties
in implementing advanced technologies to produce high-quality vegetables due to
technical, managerial and financial constraints (Hu & Xia, 2007). As a result, they are
largely excluded from most modern high-value market outlets such as supermarkets,
processing industries and international markets. The participation of smallholders in
such markets requires that they have the capacity to comply with buyers' high quality
requirements and are capable of closely co-operating with them (Anon., 2006).
There is a growing recognition that relationships play an important role in supply
chain management (Leuthesser & Kohli, 1995; Narasimhan & Kim, 2002). Meanwhile,
transaction cost economics (TCE) has become one ofthe most frequently used theoretical
frameworks in studying such business relationships (Klein et a!', 1990; Hobbs &
Young, 2001). Researchers regard trust as an important lubricant of a social system
and widely treat it as an influencing factor in TCE-related constructs (Batt & Rexha,
1999; Vakis et a!', 2003; Ruben et a!', 2oo7b).
Vegetable producers in China are experiencing low productivity and inefficient
marketing performance due to the high level of transaction costs in a transitional agri-
cultural environment (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). Scholars are now focusing on new ways to
facilitate the entry of small-scale farmers in developing countries (such as China) into
commercial agrifood chains (e.g., Vorley et a!', 2007). Earlier studies focused heavily
on the application of better production and crop management practices (Anon., 1998),
or on the introduction of improved incentives to enhance farmers' willingness to invest
in more advanced production methods (Hueth et a!', 1999). Far less attention has been
given to options to improve co-ordination and personal relationships (called guanxi in
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China) or trust among farmers and between farmers and their buyers, as an alternative
strategy to reduce transaction costs, upgrade quality, expand markets, and improve
performance (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). The purpose of this article is to investigate the
effect of personal guanxi and trust in reducing transaction costs in vegetable supply
chains, and improving small-scale farmers' participation in emerging market outlets. We
hope to provide insights into ways to enhance farmers' market position and increase
their welfare in a modern market environment, and identify institutional and structural
deficiencies that need to be addressed during policy making.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section develops
the theoretical framework by reviewing the literature on guanxi, trust and transaction
costs in supply chains. The research design is then described, followed by the empirical
results. The discussions, conclusions, and some policy implications are presented in
the last chapter.
Theoretical perspective
Transaction costs in supply chains
With transactions as the focus of analysis (as opposed to the actual goods), TCE recog-
nizes that transactions do not occur in a frictionless economic vacuum. Transactions
involve costs because they typically require farmers to search for buyers with whom
to exchange, screen potential buyers to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargain with
potential buyers to reach an agreement, transfer the product, and monitor the agree-
ment to see whether its conditions are fulfilled and enforced. These costs increase
with the frequency of the transactions, the specificity of the assets involved, and the
uncertainty of the transactions (Williamson, 1979).
Transaction costs are often subdivided into search or information costs, negotiation
costs and monitoring or enforcement costs (Hobbs, 1997; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
Four key concepts underlie TCE: (I) information asymmetry, (2) bounded rationality,
(3) opportunism, and (4) asset specificity. In Williamson's (1979) pioneering work, the
characteristics of a transaction were linked to the governance structures from 'classical
contracting' (spot markets) at one end of the spectrum to unified governance (vertical
integration) at the other. The level of transaction costs incurred in the transactions
encourages agents to build closer business relationships and look for low-risk governance
to reduce the effects of transaction costs.
The presence of transaction costs implies that the efficiency of exchanges can
become seriously constrained, and keeps many farmers from participating in certain
agricultural markets (De Janvry et a!', 1991). The selection of market outlet is largely
dependent on the level of transaction costs incurred in transactions (Hobbs, 1997;
Bailey & Hunnicutt, 2002). In other words, the transaction costs associated with
exchanges are barriers to market access for resource-poor smallholders (Ruijs et a!',
2004; Kyeyamwa, 2007).
Economists always try to measure transaction costs directly in agricultural markets
(Sadoulet & De Janvry, 1995; Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Kyeyamwa, 2007). However, in
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many cases the transaction costs are largely unobservable (Vakis et a!', 2003). There-
fore, the direct measurement approaches are not able to quantify the comprehensive
transaction costs in agricultural markets. In addition, Buckley & Chapman (1997)
further argued that transaction costs issues cannot be understood separately from issues
of perception (i.e., the perception and definition of reality of social actors). In this
article we therefore try to measure transaction costs indirectly, i.e., based on farmers'
perceptions.
Guanxi and transaction costs
Guanxi is first and foremost about the cultivation oflong-term personal relationships
(Standifird & Marshall, 2000). In Chinese society, guanxi is ubiquitous and plays an
important role in daily social and business life. Guanxi is transferable from one person
to the other. For example, if person A wants to request person C something with whom
A has no guanxi, A may seek out a member of his guanxi network, person B, who has
guanxi with C. When B introduces A to C, a guanxi may be established between A and
C (Tsang, 1998). The transferability of guanxi permits the development of individual
guanxi and ultimately leads to a multilayer guanxi network (Standifird & Marshall,
2000). Guanxi networks provide supportive assurance in exchange behaviour, which
makes it easier for farmers to acquire advanced technology and knowledge and to
achieve superior market performance (Luo & Chen, 1997; Lu et a!', 2008).
The transaction cost advantage of guanxi-based exchange specifically lies in the
way guanxi deals with governance problems associated with bounded rationality and
opportunism (Standifird & Marshall, 2000). In a guanxi network, farmers know buyers
well. They can easily access required information about product supply and demand.
The transparency leaves less room for farmers and buyers to behave opportunistically.
With the assurance of a guanxi network, the loss of exchange opportunities with one
network participant can easily develop into banishment of that participant by the entire
network. So the cost of opportunism is the potential loss of exchange opportunities
with all members of the network.
Guanxi networks also provide a sophisticated means for screening potential partners
(Standifird & Marshall, 2000). The flexible and socially-based nature ofguanxi networks
also permits members of a guanxi network to deal with contingencies arising after
agreements are reached. Therefore, guanxi networks possess the capacity to reduce
ex ante transaction costs associated with environmental uncertainties, such as com-
municating, negotiating and co-ordinating transactions (Davies et a!', 1995). Guanxi
also reduces transaction costs associated with behavioural uncertainties that arise from
bounded rationality. Transaction costs derived from screening and selecting partners
can be reduced due to the latent strength of guanxi networks. The fast information flow
within the guanxi network provides rapid (in)direct feedback on partners' performance,
so ex post transaction costs are also reduced.
Trust and transaction costs
Trust is considered to exist if one party believes that the other party is honest or benev-
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olent (Doney & Cannon, 1997). It is the expectation that one party in the transaction
will not behave opportunistically (Gulati, 1995). Based on experimental studies, Ostrom
& Walker (2003) concluded that trust appears to be a core variable explaining the co-
operation behaviour of people. Nooteboom (2002) further argued that trust is produced
through personal interactions. Trust develops gradually, evolving in a slow process where
there is risk and hence little trust in the beginning enabling individuals to develop their
relations and engage in major transactions. Therefore, trust is a relationship-based
concept, which is created, reinforced, or decreased by bilateral activities in a series of
economic exchanges (Suh & Kwon, 2006). If trust exists in a business relationship,
each counterpart will be convinced that they will not be victims ofbehaviour hazard
such as adverse selection, moral risk, and hold-up. So trust functions are an important
lubricant for relationships that bind parties and has an important future orientation.
Trust has been theorized to reduce opportunistic behaviour, and hence mitigates
transaction costs in business practice. Whenever trust is present, farmers can lower
their guard and economize on transaction costs. Trust minimizes search costs, and
facilitates the enforcement of contracts. Therefore trust enables farmers to place and
take orders with less risk and less conflict, provide exchange credit, and offer warranty
- all features that are often dramatically absent from liberalized markets in developing
countries (Fafchamps & Minten, 1998). Trust also makes it easier for farmers to
renegotiate their contractual obligations when problems arise, thereby providing
much-needed flexibility in dealing with external shocks. In addition, trust facilitates
the circulation of reliable information about technology and market opportunities,
as well as the blacklist of unreliable agents (Barr, 1998).
The economic value of trust also has to be considered when it is based on non-
contractual mechanisms (Dyer, 1997). Non-contractual trust (such as goodwill) eliminates
the need for formal contracts, which are costly to write, monitor, and enforce. For
example, in conditions of high trust, farmers spend less time and resources on ex
ante contracting because they trust that the pay-off will be divided fairly. So there is no
need for future contingencies. Trusted parties spend less time and resources on monitor-
ing to see if the other party is not shirking or is fulfilling the agreement. Therefore
ex post transaction costs are also lower. Trust also enables participants in an exchange
relationship to share important confidential information, which significantly reduces
transaction costs, as discussed earlier. Trust also encourages farmers and buyers to
make relationship-specific investments, which in turn enhances productivity in the
exchange relationship without fear of opportunism (Dyer, 1997).
Farmer-specific factors and transaction costs
A number of farmer-specific variables may also have an impact on the costs incurred
by farmers in the process of exchange, like age, education level, market experience, and
household size (Kyeyamwa, 2007; Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). Age can often be indicative of
farmer's knowledge, reputation, and social networks (e.g., social capital), all of which
reduce certain information, negotiation, and enforcement costs. A high education level
is associated with lower costs of searching, reduced time of synthesizing and acting on
the information, and improved skills of negotiation. Households with more members
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and more market experience may have more information sources and knowledge about
negotiating. Furthermore, the resources farmers own (e.g., farmland), and the distance
to the market may also influence transaction costs. Farmers with more farmland
generally have strong negotiation power and therefore are easier to select as preferred
suppliers by buyers in emerging markets (Ruben et a!', 2oo7a). In addition, land
quality and distance to the market are also effectively associated with transaction
costs (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b).
Research design
Data
We collected data in Jiangsu Province, using semi-structured questionnaires. To op-
timize questionnaire items, valuable insights were obtained through a series of eight
case studies (Lu et a!', 2006). The interviewees in these case studies were asked to give
feedback on the questions and questionnaire layout. They provided useful suggestions
for improving the accuracy and relevance of the measurements for each construct,
which improved the content validity of the constructs. Forward and backward translation
techniques were used to translate the English questionnaire into Chinese.
Samples were selected following a stratified random selection procedure. Based
on the different economic levels in various geographic areas, we first divided Jiangsu
Province into three areas: a less developed, an intermediate, and a developed area.
We then randomly selected five counties: one from the less developed and one from
the developed area, and three from the intermediate area, based on the total number
ofvegetable farmers in each area. Thereafter, one village was randomly selected from
each county, resulting in five villages. The final step of the sampling procedure involved
selecting the sample households from the selected villages. In each village we randomly
selected 30-40 vegetable farm households, based on the total number of farmers in
the village concerned. The actual data collection was based on personal interviews in
the field in each selected village during 2004 and 2005. Excluding the farmers who
were not commercialized and those with incomplete information, a total of 167 farmers
interviewed finally formed the dataset for empirical analysis in this article.
Measurement of latent variables
In this study, three variables were measured by a multiple-item-latent construct:
guanxi, trust, and transaction costs. The other variables were binary (i.e., emerging
market participation), categorical (i.e., education and land quality), or numeric (i.e.,
age, experience, household size, total farmland, and distance to the market). The latent
constructs were operationalized by multiple-item measures on a five-point Likert scale
(1 ~ not true at all; 5 ~ totally true). Transferring the concept of transaction costs to the
operational domain remains elusive (Grover & Malhotra, 2003). In line with common
practice (Hobbs, 1997; Grover & Malhotra, 2003; Escobal, 2005) we disentangled dif-
ferent components of transaction costs into information costs, negotiation costs and
26 NJAS 55-4, 2008
Role of guanxi, trust and farmer-specific factors in emerging vegetable markets in China
enforcement costs. Below is a brief introduction to how each latent variable was measu-
red. Detailed information on the measurement of the latent variables is listed in Table 1.
Guanxi refers to the extent to which vegetable farmers use guanxi networks to
facilitate their transactions. In this study we focused on the supportive effects of
farmers' guanxi networks on vegetable transactions. Two items were used to measure
the construct of guanxi networks, including level of agreement with the statement
"My guanxi networks support me in finding (new) buyers / gaining access to (new)
markets".
Trust refers to the belief that the other partner is honest and sincere, and under
no circumstances will do anything to damage the relationship. Previous transaction
experience, reputation and trustworthiness of the partners are the major reflective
perspectives for trust. Interpersonal trust was the focus in this study because the case
studies showed that the vegetable transactions in the research area were largely based
on interpersonal activities. Seven items were used to measure trust in this study.
Information costs refer to the perceived costs (may also be time) incurred to find
market-related information, such as price, potential buyers or marketing trends. Public
media, such as newspapers, TV and radio, and neighbours are important information
sources for farmers. The farmers' neighbours are generally vegetable producers as well,
so they are well aware of the real market situation. Under some circumstances farmers
need to contact traders and other buyers to get market information. Two items were
used to measure information costs in this study.
Negotiation costs refer to the perceived costs (may also be time) related to negoti-
ating a transaction with buyers. Negotiation costs in this study were evaluated by two
items: (I) the number ofbuyers, and (2) the number of rounds needed to negotiate
before reaching a transaction agreement.
Enforcement costs refer to the perceived costs related to monitoring buyers'
behaviour in order to make sure the agreement or the conditions of a contract are
being fulfilled. To measure enforcement costs three items were used: (I) farmers'
previous transaction experience, (2) the duration of their relationship with buyers,
and (3) their reputation.
Methods
The purification of the multiple-item constructs was carried out using SPSS. First,
exploratory factor analysis was conducted in SPSS to determine the best multiple items
for each construct. Thereafter Cronbach's alpha was calculated for each construct to show
the construct's reliability. Table I lists all items for each latent construct used in this stu-
dy. Cronbach's alpha for all constructs was greater than or close to 0.7, indicating a high
level ofconstruct reliability. Factor loadings for each item was greater than 0.7, showing
that the items were closely related to their corresponding constructs (Hair et a!', 1998).
All transaction cost variables in this study were endogenous variables. So an
instrumental variable approach could be applied. For instrumental variable regressions
to work, each instrument must satisfy two conditions, i.e., instrumental relevance
and instrumental exogeneity. If an instrument is relevant, then the variation in the
instrument is related to the variation in the instrumented variable (e.g., transaction
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Table 1. Measurement scales of the latent constructs used in the study.
Construct I Cronbach's Item
alpha
Factor
loading 2
Guanxi
Trust
My guanxi networks support me to access (new) markets.
My guanxi networks support me to find (new) buyers.
The buyers I trade with have a good reputation.
I should not hesitate to make important selling decisions
based on my buyers' suggestions.
My current relationships with my buyers are satisfactory.
I expect my buyers to be working with me for a long time.
My buyers have been fair in their negotiations with me.
Based on experience, I can rely on my buyers with complete
confidence to keep their promises to me.
The buyers are trustworthy. 0.85
Information 0.76
Negotiation 0.75
It costs me time and effort to acquire market information from 0.87
public media.
It costs me time and effort to acquire market information from 0.92
my neighbours.
I negotiate with more than one buyer before making a
transaction.
I negotiate in more than one round with buyers before
agreeing on a price.
Enforcement 0.69
costs
I seek out the advice of my buyers regarding quality.
I have known my buyers for a long time.
If I cheat my buyers, I will lose my reputation immediately.
0.80
28
I All constructs were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ~ not true at all; 5 ~ totally true).
2 A factor loading is the Pearson correlation between the item and the construct.
costs). In addition, it must satisfy the exclusion restriction, i.e., the instrument must be
uncorrelated with the outcome variable of choice (e.g., emerging market participation).
Another consideration is that the dependent variable is binary and equal to I if the farmer
participates in an emerging market, and 0 otherwise. Consequently, the ordinary least
squares estimator is not preferable and non-linear limited dependent variable specifi-
cations must be adopted that could accommodate the treatment for the endogeneity of
the transaction cost variables. Therefore, an instrumental variable two-stage probit mo-
del (IVProbit) was applied. The IVProbit procedure in Stata attempts to fit models with
dichotomous dependent variables and endogenous regressors via maximum likelihood
estimations ofAmemiya's generalized least square estimator (Newey, 1987). However,
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the test of instrument validity does not exist for limited dependent variable models so
that we should interpret the results with caution.
The variables guanxi, trust, land quality, and distance to the market served as
instrumental variables. As discussed earlier, all four effectively influence transaction
costs in vegetable transactions. Regarding farmers' participation in emerging markets,
land quality plays a limited role. Distance to the market is very important for timely
delivery of products. The good-quality roads and transportation facilities in Jiangsu
Province help farmers deliver products to all markets. Guanxi is present whether farmers
use it or not; so it may have equal effects on all market outlets. Trust relationships with
buyers in the emerging markets will be built up once farmers begin to actually parti-
cipate in them, so it is not a factor during the farmers' market selection process. In
summary, four variables: guanxi, trust, land quality, and distance to the market, satisfy
the conditions of instrumental relevance and instrumental exogeneity.
Empirical results
Baseline description
Table 2 lists the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analyses.
Vegetable production in China is characterized by its long history, small scale, use of
traditional techniques, and scattered activities (Liu et a!', 2004). Farmers in Jiangsu
Province have on average more than 20 years of experience in vegetable production.
Production scales in the research area are rather small (3.2 mu or 0.2 ha per farm house-
hold) and production activities are diversified. Vegetable farmers in Jiangsu Province
are generally older (with an average age of 52) and have a limited education. They are
also not very well organized, so they produce and market vegetables independently. As
a result, farmers possess less power in the negotiation process than buyers and face a
lot of constraints in selling vegetables to emerging market outlets. Farmers perceive
a high level of transaction costs, especially information and negotiation costs in both
production and marketing activities (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). The average distance to the
market is about 5.3 km, and farmers perceive that the quality of their land is good.
After a long period of development, Chinese vegetable markets became more
competitive in recently decades (Ahmadi-Esfahani & Stanmore, 1997). The vegetable
marketing system in Jiangsu Province is now made up of multiple outlets. Farmers
traditionally sold vegetables to conventional market outlets, such as wet markets and
wholesale markets. Recently, some have been putting a lot ofeffort into selling vegetables
to emerging modern market outlets, such as supermarkets, processing industries
and even international markets. Delivery conditions, trust relationships and quality
demands differ widely amongst different market outlets, occasioning various types of
transaction costs and offering farmers different implicit incentives for improving their
production systems and quality management regimes (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). However,
conventional markets still dominate vegetable distribution in China, accounting for
more than 90% of total vegetable production. The remaining 10% represents relatively
high-quality vegetables that are sold to emerging market outlets (Lu, 2007).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
Variable
Latent construct I
Guanxi
Trust
Information costs
Negotiation costs
Enforcement costs
Other
Emerging market participation (0 ~ no; I~ yes)
Age of interviewee (years)
Education level of interviewee 3
Experience of interviewee (years)
Household size (persons)
Total farmland area (mu 4)
Distance to market (x IO km)
Land quality S
Mean
1.20
22.03
4.06
3. 22
SD 2
0.62
0·54
0.51
0.69
0.62
0·35
IO·48
0.9 1
12.62
1.63
2.28
1.08
30
I Means and standard deviations for the latent constructs were calculated based on unweighted average
scores.
2 SD ~ standard deviation.
3 0 ~ illiterate; I ~ primary school; 2 ~ middle school; 3 ~ high school; 4 ~ above high school.
4 I mu~ 1/15 ha.
S I ~ very low; 2 ~ low; 3 ~ average; 4 ~ high; 5 ~ very high.
Influence of guanxi, trust and farmer-specific factors on transaction costs
The instruments used in this study are strong predictors of the effect of guanxi and
trust on transaction costs in vegetable marketing chains (the first stage of IVProbit anal-
ysis, see Table 3). The results show that guanxi in vegetable supply chains significantly
influences information costs and enforcement costs incurred in vegetable transactions.
These results are consistent with our previous theoretical discussions. In a guanxi
network, farmers can spend less time and effort in determining where and to whom
to sell vegetables. So they incur relatively low information costs in selling vegetables.
Guanxi networks safeguard transactions and reduce opportunistic behaviour during
and after transactions. Hence, the enforcement costs are low for farmers with good
guanxi networks.
An unexpected result, however, was the positive relationship found between guanxi
networks and negotiation costs. This may be explained by the way in which negotiation
costs were measured in this study. As discussed earlier, negotiation costs were usually
measured by the number ofbuyers and the number of rounds needed to negotiate a
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Table 3. Regression results of the variables that influence the transaction costs in vegetable chains. I
Variable Information costs Negotiation costs Enforcement costs
Regression SE 2 Regression SE Regression SE
coefficient 3 coefficient coefficient
Guanxi -0.14 ** 0.07 0·59 *** 0.09 -0.16 ** 0.08
Trust -0.5 6 *** 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.26 *** 0.07
Age interviewee (years) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01 0.003 0.01
Education level interviewee 4 -O.II* 0.07 O.ro 0.06 0.16 * 0.09
Experience interviewee (years) 0.003 0.005 0.01* 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01
Household size (persons) -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05
Total farmland area (mu) -0.06 ** 0.03 -0.003 0.03 -0.04 0.03
Distance to market (x ro km) 0.04 0.04 -0.07 * 0.05 0.03 0.05
Land quality -0.29 *** O.ro -0.25 ** O.II -0.05 O.II
---------------------
Constant 2.14 *** 0.68 1.42 ** 0.61 0.19 0.7 2
I The results ofthe first-stage Instrumental Variables Endogenous Probit Model. The Davidon- Fletcher-
Powell algorithm was used to maximize the likelihood function. For a detailed discussion on the algorithm
methods in Stata see Gould et al. (2006).
2 SE ~ standard error.
3 Levels of statistical significance: * ~ P < O.ro; ** ~ P < 0.005; *** ~ P < 0.01.
4 0 ~ illiterate; 1 ~ primary school; 2 ~ middle school; 3 ~ high school; 4 ~ above high school.
transaction. With well-developed personal relationships farmers have more opportu-
nities to meet different buyers, which may encourage them to negotiate with more
buyers in more rounds in order to obtain a good price. The positive effect of guanxi on
negotiation costs may also be explained by the lock-in effects of the networks (Liu et a!.,
2008). In studying the role of guanxi in labour markets in China, Zhang & Li (2003)
and Huang (2008) found that guanxi networks may support nepotism or agency problems,
and therefore discriminate against those who do not have access to guanxi networks.
Vegetable farmers may face the same problem. They engage in a guanxi network that
may hamper them accessing to other networks to get necessary information. So more
efforts are needed for them to negotiate with buyers.
Trust decreases information and enforcement costs significantly. This indicates
that farmers' previous transaction experience, their satisfactory relationships with
buyers, and buyers with a high reputation and trustworthiness reduce time and efforts
needed to acquire market information, and reduce the necessity to enforce the transac-
tions. All these are consistent with the theoretical discussion. A recent study discovered
that guanxi networks have moderating effects on the relationship between trust and
relational risk in marketing channels (Liu et a!., 2008). This means that the effects of
trust on the reduction of transaction costs in vegetable transactions may be reinforced
in the presence of guanxi networks.
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We did not find a statistically significant effect of trust on negotiation costs. This may
be because of the low development level of farmer organizations in China. Individual
personal networks are not able to efficiently improve farmers' negotiation power. Also
because of their limited relationships with buyers, farmers face tough negotiations in
all transactions no matter how well their guanxi networks function.
The results also show that several farmer-specific factors have a significant impact
on transaction costs. Older farmers may have more knowledge about negotiating with
buyers, and thus incur less negotiation costs. Farmers with a high level of education
have more knowledge and capacity to acquire necessary market information, thus less
information costs incurred. Well-educated farmers, however, may seek new buyers and
even new markets, exploring new opportunities, which may significantly increase
enforcement costs. Farmers with rich market experience may know more about their
buyers; therefore less monitoring efforts are required. Meanwhile, experienced farmers
may also have good personal (guanxi) networks that offer more opportunities to negoti-
ate with more buyers and for good prices. Farmers' production scale reduces informa-
tion costs significantly. Large-scale farmers are more attractive to buyers, so less time
and efforts are needed for them to find buyers. Farmers who live far away from the
markets incur less negotiation costs. This may be because farmers have to travel far and
need much time to reach urban consumers in Jiangsu Province, which leaves them lit-
tle time for negotiations as they have to go back to work in the field. We found that this
was quite a common situation faced by most of the farmers in the research area at the
time of the field interviews. In addition, good quality land reduces farmers' information
and negotiation costs too. This may be because high-quality land generally produces
better quality vegetables, which makes selling vegetables at the market easier.
However, we did not find a statistically significant impact of household size on the
reduction of transaction costs in vegetable transactions in the research area. Further
empirical investigation may be needed.
Influence of transaction costs and farmer-specific factors on farmers' partici-
pation in emerging markets
The factors determining farmers' participation in emerging market outlets in Jiangsu
Province are listed in Table 4 (the second-stage result ofIVProbit analysis). The results
show that information costs and negotiation costs in vegetable transactions significantly
reduced the probability of farmers participating in emerging market outlets in Jiangsu
Province. This implies that if farmers have problems in accessing necessary information
or possess less power in the negotiation process, they will probably be excluded from
most emerging market outlets, such as supermarkets, processing industries and inter-
national markets. In the modern marketing environments it is essential for farmers to
build strong and reliable personal networks and trustworthy buyer-seller relationships
in order to reduce information costs, thereby helping them to gain access to emerging
markets. In addition, organized individual farmers may improve their power in the
negotiation process and earn them a better position in transactions in emerging markets.
Surprisingly, a strong positive relationship between enforcement costs and farmers'
participation in emerging markets was found in this study. This may be because the
32 NJAS 56-1/2, 2008
Role of guanxi, trust and farmer-specific factors in emerging vegetable markets in China
product quality and safety requirements and delivery conditions are much higher in
emerging markets than in conventional ones; therefore, more efforts are usually
necessary to ensure the completion of the transactions in emerging markets. The
recent occurrence of food quality and safety crises in China (for example: melamine
in pet food and baby formula) increasingly asks for a better quality control system and
more restricted regulation throughout the chain. A tracking and tracing system was
implemented in the vegetable sector in Nanjing City in order to ensure vegetable
quality and safety. All critical information on vegetable production, harvesting, delivery,
and transactions was registered. If quality/safety issues occur in the late stages of the
chain it is possible to trace the vegetables back to their origin and identify the source
of the problems. In addition, a complete fast testing system both in the fields and in
Table 4. Regression results ofvariables that influence farmers' participation in emerging market outlets. I
Variable
Information costs
Negotiation costs
Enforcement costs
Age of interviewee (years)
Education level of interviewee 4
Experience of interviewee (years)
Household size (persons)
Total farmland area (mu)
Constant
Statistics
No. of observations
Waldx" (8)
Log pseudolikelihood
p> X"
Wald test of exogeneity
Emerging market
participation
Regression SE"
coefficient 3
-0.78 *** 0.22
-1.5 0 *** 0.14
0.21 * 0.12
-0.02 0.01
-0.25 0.18
0.003 0.01
0.20 ** 0.09
-0.06 0.06
-0.90 0.80
167
162.87
-608.3 6
0.0000
68.29
0.0000
I Results ofthe second-stage Instrumental Variables Endogenous Probit Model. The Davidon-Fletcher-
Powell algorithm was used to maximize the likelihood function. For a detailed discussion on the algorithm
methods in Stata see Gould et al. (2006).
" SE ~ standard error.
Levels of statistical significance: * ~ p < O.ro; ** ~ P < 0.05; *** ~ P < 0.01.
4 a ~ illiterate; I ~ primary school; 2 ~ middle school; 3 ~ high school; 4 ~ above high school.
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retailing markets was set up. Under these circumstances, farmers face more challenges
and need more efforts to ensure their production process and produced vegetables are
consistent with the quality and safety requirements in emerging market outlets.
The results also indicate a positive relationship between household size and the
probability of farmer's participation in emerging markets. Farm households with
more members may build up more extended guanxi networks and therefore may easily
obtain market information and thus can participate more easily in emerging markets.
During the last decade, non-farm employment is developing quickly in China (Zhang
& Li, 2003; Feng, 2008). Most of the farm households have family member(s) partici-
pating in non-farm employment. The engagement of household members in non-farm
employment improves farmers' capacity to invest in advanced production technologies
and better marketing facilities (Feng, 2008), which may contribute to the improvement
ofvegetable quality and safety. As a result, farmers may have better opportunities to
participate in emerging market outlets.
Discussion, conclusions, and policy implications
In this study we used a latent variable approach to measure main variables. The effective-
ness of the latent variables, however, may have suffered from the possible shortcomings
of the reliability and validity of the scales. Earlier studies claimed that the measurement
scale for guanxi is still underdeveloped (Lee & Humphreys, 2007). A widely accepted
and used scale is not available in the literature. The two items that were used to measure
guanxi in this article may not be able to capture the comprehensive effect of guanxi in
businesses. Furthermore, farmers' market experience may be related to their age and
education, and thus may be a potentially endogenous problem. Although the Wald test
showed that there was no statistically significant exogeneity problem in our model (see
Table 4), further investigation with more samples from additional research areas may
help to validate the results. Therefore we should interpret the results obtained from this
study with caution.
This article explored the effects of guanxi, trust and farmer-specific factors on the
reduction of transaction costs in vegetable supply chains, and thereby on smallholders'
participation in emerging markets in China. The outcome of this study has practical
relevance for vegetable farmers because it represents the conditions through which
farmers can become better integrated into a modern market economy.
Our empirical results support the common belief that transaction costs are a signif-
icant constraint on market participation. Policies that try to improve farmers' welfare
and market performance should particularly focus on the reduction of transaction costs
as a feasible strategy (Ruben et a!', 2oo7b). In particular, attention should be given to
measures that reduce transaction costs within major vegetable marketing chains in
China. Our empirical analyses confirm that both information costs and negotiation
costs significantly constrain vegetable farmers' participation in emerging markets in
China. Information costs can be effectively reduced through well-developed personal guanxi
networks and trustworthy buyer-seller relationships. In this respect, policies targeting on
the improvement of farmers' trustworthiness and facilitating the building of trust between
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farmers and their buyers may be very effective in promoting smallholders' participation.
Transaction costs can be reduced by improving market information release systems.
The lack of price transparency and absence of personal trust can seriously hamper
fluid transactions (Ruben et a!., 2oo7b). Since poor communication prevents efficient
access to market information, accessible and effective communication networks in the
rural areas need to be further developed. Currently, the wholesale and retail prices in
major market places in the urban area of China are spread daily through internet and
newspapers. However, most farmers are not able to instantly access such information.
As a result, the current system can only help farmers to a limited extent. With the fast
development of mobile networks in China, using mobile phone messages (SMS) to
release market information may be an efficient and economic way to improve market
transparency in China. During the fieldwork interviews we observed that most farmers
had mobile phones for social and business communications. So it will be much easier
and faster for farmers to acquire necessary information via SMS and to arrange production
and marketing activities.
Transaction costs can also be reduced through more co-ordinated and collaborative
relationships between farmers and their buyers. Although guanxi has been prevalent
for thousands ofyears in China, and is deeply embedded in the mindset of the Chinese,
the influence of guanxi in modern business is declining and ultimately may be taken
over by the legal system (Guthrie, 1998). The economic transition in the Chinese
vegetable markets increasingly requires adjustment in the sphere of market integration
(Ruben et a!., 2oo7b). The potential to reduce transaction costs in agricultural markets
through innovative institutional arrangements, such as horizontal co-ordination (e.g.,
farmers' organizations), vertical collaboration (e.g., contract farming or preferred sup-
pliers), and chain optimization has been emphasized by researchers such as Verhaegen
& Van Huylenbroeck (1999), Deshingkar et a!. (2003), Reardon et a!. (2003) and Ruben
et a!. (2oo7a). In China, developing farmers' organizations (e.g., farmers' co-operatives
or professional associations) deserve serious attention as a device for reducing transaction
costs (especially negotiation costs) (Hu et a!., 2004; Ruben et a!., 2oo7a). Further
institutional reforms may therefore be needed to enhance market-driven conditions
for improving small-scale farmers' marketing performance.
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